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Post-Keynesian Alternative 
Policies to Curb Macroeconomic 
Imbalances in the Euro Area 
 
Summary: In this paper we outline alternative post-Keynesian policy recom-
mendations addressing the problems of differential inflation, divergence in
competitiveness and associated current account imbalances within the Euro
area. We provide a basic framework in order to systematically address the
related issues making use of Anthony P. Thirlwall’s (1979, 2002) model of a
“balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate” (BPCGR). Based on this
framework, we outline the required stance for alternative economic policies and 
then we discuss the implications for alternative monetary, wage/incomes and
fiscal policies in the Euro area as a whole, as well as the consequences for
structural and regional policies in the Euro area periphery, in particular. 
Key words: Differential inflation rates, Current account imbalances, Competi-
tiveness, Euro area economic policies. 
JEL: E61, E62, E63, E64.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper we outline alternative policy recommendations addressing the problems 
of differential inflation, divergence in competitiveness and associated current account 
imbalances within the Euro area based on a post-Keynesian macroeconomic ap-
proach. The major purpose of these alternative policy proposals is to generate sus-
tainably high demand and output growth in the Euro area, providing high levels of 
non-inflationary employment, as well as preventing “export-led mercantilist” and 
“debt-led consumption boom” types of development, both within the Euro area and 
with respect to the role of the Euro area in the world economy. These types of devel-
opment, generated by “finance dominated capitalism”, have shaped the global and 
Euro area economies before the crisis, and they have each proven to be unsustainable 
(Eckhard Hein 2012, 2013a, b; Hein and Nina Dodig 2014). 
In Section 1 we will start by presenting the theoretical framework, Thirlwall’s 
(1979, 2002) model of a BPCGR. In Section 2 we will then outline the broad eco-
nomic policy implications deriving from this framework. Section 3 will then be de-
voted to a more precise discussion of an alternative coordinated macroeconomic pol-
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icy mix for the Euro area, which is understood as a policy package that would have 
to be jointly implemented. First, we will discuss the role of monetary policies and of 
the European Central Bank (ECB); second, we will turn to wage and incomes poli-
cies; and third, we will outline the role of fiscal policies. Against this background, we 
will then in, Section 4, turn to the discussion of some ideas to re-structure the econ-
omies of the periphery and the crisis countries, in particular, in order to facilitate me-
dium- to long-run catching-up with the more mature countries of the Euro area core. 
Section 5 will summarise and conclude. The focus of this paper is on the presentation 
of a coherent alternative to current economic policies in the Euro area. This alterna-
tive is based on a post-Keynesian perspective on macroeconomics and macroeco-
nomic policies and on recent contributions from this perspective to different areas of 
European economic policies. Constraints of space prevent a comprehensive critique 
of the current economic policy architecture and economic policies which caused and 
deepened the euro crisis, as well as a systematic comparison of our approach with 
several other alternatives presented in the literature. We have dealt with these issues 
in Hein (2013b) and, in particular, in Hein and Daniel Detzer (2014), which provides 
a more extensive background for the current paper. The interested reader is referred 
to these publications. 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
We chose Thirlwall’s (1979, 2002) model of a BPCGR as a starting point for the 
presentation of post-Keynesian alternatives to curb macroeconomic imbalances in the 
Euro area, because this model allows for a systematic and consistent discussion of 
the interrelationships between current account balances, inflation differentials and 
non-price competitiveness. However, for our purposes this approach will have to be 
modified, as we will explain below. Applying the BPCGR model to a currency area 
yields the following determinants of the BPCGR for a single member country: 
 
,   (1)
 
where  is the BPCGR for the domestic economy,  is the foreign real GDP 
growth rate, i.e. the growth rate of the rest of the Euro area since its current account 
with the rest of the world was roughly balanced before the financial, economic and 
euro crises and should remain in balance in the future,  is domestic inflation,  
is foreign inflation, i.e. inflation in the rest of the Euro area, η is the price elasticity of 
the demand for exports, ψ is the price elasticity of demand for imports, ε is the in-
come elasticity of the demand for exports and π is the income elasticity of the de-
mand for imports. Disparities in ε and π among countries are considered to reflect 
differences in non-price competitiveness. With given foreign GDP growth and given 
foreign inflation, the BPCGR of a single economy can be improved by lower domes-
tic inflation, provided that , i.e. the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, a 
higher income elasticity of domestic exports, or a lower income elasticity of domes-
tic imports. 
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Applying the model to the member countries of the Euro area means that each 
of the member countries should grow at its BPCGR, i.e. avoid current account sur-
pluses and current account deficits. In principle, each of the countries should also 
target the same rate of inflation and thus equalise domestic and foreign inflation. This 
is so because a rate of inflation below the foreign rate will mean a higher BPCGR of 
the country under consideration; it implies, however, a lower BPCGR of the other 
countries of the Euro area, provided that its current account with the rest of the world 
is roughly balanced. Following the rule of equal inflation rates across the member 
countries of the currency union, therefore, implies that the BPCGR for each of the 
member countries would become: 
 
.   (2)
             
Since, according to Equation (1), Thirlwall’s BPCGR, applied to a currency 
union (without any internal nominal exchange rates), is determined by inflation diffe-
rentials (provided that the Marshall-Lerner condition can be assumed to hold) by the 
income elasticities of the demand for imports and exports, and by the rate of real 
GDP growth of the trading partners, we can identify several causes for current ac-
count imbalances in a currency union. 
The first, and general one, is, of course, GDP growth differentials between the 
different Euro area member countries exceeding those implied by their respective 
BPCGRs. These will be associated with a deterioration of the current account posi-
tion in the countries growing “too fast”, and an improvement in the countries grow-
ing “too slow”. From an economic policy perspective, we can distinguish two differ-
ent causes for countries growing “too fast” relative to their BPCGR - catch-up 
processes associated with high investment in productive capital, on the one hand, and 
bubble-induced growth associated with asset and/or housing price booms and high 
investment in real estate and/or high debt-financed consumption, on the other hand. 
Whereas the former should be welcomed from an economic policy perspective aim-
ing at “promot(ing) economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among 
Member States” (Treaty on European Union 2010, Article 3.3), the latter should be 
avoided by appropriate economic policies and institutions.  
From another angle we could also argue that the BPCGR are “too low” or “too 
high” given the actual growth rates of the respective economies. The first reason for 
this could be too high inflation differentials, which cause a “too low” or “too high” 
BPCGR for the respective countries, given their actual growth differentials. A major 
cause for inappropriate inflation differentials is, of course, differentials in unit labour 
cost growth, but changes in mark-ups in firms’ pricing, as well as differentials in the 
development of other input costs, must also to be taken into account. A second cause 
is related to quality competitiveness and hence income elasticities of exports and im-
ports. For given growth differentials within a currency union, we will observe current 
account imbalances if income elasticities of demand for exports of rapidly growing 
catching-up countries are “too low” and income elasticities of demand for imports 
are “too high”, thus reducing the BPCGR below the actual growth rate. Slowly grow-
ing mature economies will contribute to imbalances if the reverse holds true, that is 

 XˆYˆYˆ fbd
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“too high” income elasticities of the demand for their exports and “too low” income 
elasticities of their demand for imports, hence lifting the BPCGR above the actual 
growth rate. 
 
2. The General Stance Required for Policy Alternatives 
 
From this perspective, economic policies would generally have to focus on generat-
ing high, non-inflationary, demand growth in the Euro area, as close as possible to 
the Euro area BPCGR, on the one hand, and to improve non-price competitiveness 
with respect to the rest of the world, in order to lift the Euro area BPCGR, on the 
other hand. Furthermore, preventing “export-led mercantilist” and “debt-led con-
sumption boom” types of development, which have dominated the Euro area before 
the crisis (Hein 2013b), is of utmost importance, both within the Euro area but also 
with respect to the role of the Euro area as a whole in the world economy. In order to 
internally rebalance the Euro area, economic policies would have to focus on the mu-
tual adjustment of actual growth rates of member countries and the respective 
BPCGRs. In the short-run, this means stimulating aggregate demand and growth in 
the current account surplus countries relative to the Euro area average trend, and 
dampening aggregate demand and growth relative to the Euro area average trend in 
the current account deficit countries. Lowering unit labour cost growth and inflation 
relative to the Euro area average trend in current account deficit countries and in-
creasing unit labour cost growth and inflation in current account surplus countries 
will contribute to this effort - lifting the respective BPCGRs for current account defi-
cit countries and lowering it for current account surplus countries. Deflation and de-
mand depressing effects of redistribution at the expense of the labour income share 
and low income households in the current account deficit countries would have to be 
avoided. Improving non-price competitiveness of current account deficit countries 
relative to current account surplus countries will have the same effect via the respec-
tive income elasticities of demand for imports and exports. However, these are rather 
medium- to long-run economic policy targets, because they involve process and 
product innovations as well as structural change in the respective economies.  
Finally, even if the Euro area were successful in developing and applying ap-
propriate policies in line with these targets, we should not expect perfectly balanced 
current accounts of all member countries, neither in the short-run, nor in the long-
run, because of necessary catching-up processes, in particular. This will imply that 
the catching-up countries will have a tendency to grow above their BPCGRs, whe-
reas the mature countries will tend to grow below their respective BPCGRs. For this 
reason, the Euro area will have to develop a stable financing mechanism for the asso-
ciated current account deficits of catching-up member countries. As shown in Hein, 
Achim Truger, and Till van Treeck (2012), as long as the current account deficit 
country, the catching-up country in the Euro area, is growing sustainably faster than 
the mature current account surplus country, there is no risk of exploding net foreign 
debt-GDP ratios in the current account deficit country. And provided that the growth 
rate of GDP in the current account deficit country exceeds the rate of interest on net 
foreign debt, the stabilisation of the net foreign debt-GDP ratio is perfectly compati-
ble with a trade deficit of the current account deficit country (for a derivation see 
Appendix B in Hein and Detzer 2014). 
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If we include a constant and sustainable net inflow of long-term capital (C), 
the BPCGR from Equation (1) turns to (see Appendix A in Hein and Detzer 2014): 
 
, (3)
 
with  as the share of export revenues in total receipts to pay for imports, (1-) as the 
share or net capital inflows, and  as the growth rate of net capital inflows, meas-
ured in domestic currency, required to finance persistent current account deficits. 
With equal rates of inflation across the currency area, this would become: 
 
. (4)
 
Comparing Equation (4) with Equation (2) shows that net capital inflows lift 
the BPCGR of the current account deficit country if the growth rate of these inflows 
in real terms, taking into account domestic inflation, exceeds the growth rate of ex-
ports, or the growth rate of foreign GDP multiplied by the income elasticity of ex-
ports. 
 
3. More Concrete Post-Keynesian Policy Proposals for the Euro 
Area 
 
It is obvious - and developed extensively in Hein (2013b) and Dodig and Hansjörg 
Herr (2015), for example - that the current economic policy framework of the Euro 
area is inappropriate to deal with the requirements outlined above (see also Philip 
Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer 2011; Paul de Grauwe 2011a, 2013; Hein and Truger 
2011, 2014; Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl, and Eladio Febrero 2011; Hein, Truger, and van 
Treeck 2012; among several others). In fact, the current policy framework and the 
stance of the applied policies have even reinforced current account imbalances 
through different channels. First, they were unable to prevent significant inflation 
differentials to emerge within the Euro area, mainly by undermining the conditions 
for effective wage bargaining conditions as a main tool for this. Second, they did not 
provide the appropriate tools for domestic demand management in order to adjust the 
actual rate of growth of each country towards the BPCGR, mainly through applying a 
“one size fits all” policy with respect government budget balances and government 
debt in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Third, they did not pro-
vide any effective policy tools to adjust the BPCGR of the high growth current ac-
count deficit countries towards the respective growth rates, because of the lack of any 
consistent industrial and development strategy for the Euro area as a whole and for 
the catching-up countries, in particular, making sure that capital inflows into these 
countries support long-run sustainable growth. 
Therefore, alternative policy proposals would have to remedy these deficien-
cies, aiming at non-inflationary full-employment growth in the Euro area, as well as 
in each of its member countries, with sustainable current account deficits/surpluses in 
the member countries - and a roughly balanced current account for the Euro area as a 
     

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whole in order to contribute to balanced growth of the world economy. Preliminary 
outlines have been presented in Hein and Truger (2007, 2011), Hein (2012, Chapter 
8, 2013a, b), and Hein, Truger, and van Treeck (2012), among several others, based 
on general post-Keynesian macroeconomic models with the respective implications 
for the macroeconomic policy mix (Hein and Engelbert Stockhammer 2010; Arestis 
2013). We will build on these approaches. Before we start, it should be pointed out 
that the suggestions for monetary, wage/incomes, fiscal and industrial/regional poli-
cies outlined below should be understood as a policy package, which would have to 
be implemented in a coordinated way.  
 
3.1 Monetary Policy 
 
First, central bank’s interest rate policies should abstain from attempting to fine-tune 
unemployment in the short-run and inflation in the long-run, as suggested by New 
Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM), (for the NCM see, for example, Richard Clari-
da, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler 1999, and for detailed critiques of the NCM, see 
Arestis 2009, and Hein and Stockhammer 2010). Varying interest rates have cost and 
distribution effects on the business sector, which may be effective in achieving infla-
tion targets in the short-run, in particular if the economy is facing accelerating infla-
tion. With accelerating inflation, increasing the base rate of interest under the control 
of the central bank will finally also make credit and financial market rates increase 
and will be able to choke off an investment boom. But if accelerating disinflation, 
and finally deflation, prevail, interest rate policies will be ineffective due to the zero 
lower bound of the nominal interest rate, due to rising mark-ups in the setting of in-
terest rates in credit and financial markets by banks and financial intermediaries, be-
cause of increasing risk and uncertainty premia, and due to interest rate inelasticities 
of real investment of firms in a disinflationary or deflationary climate. Further on, in 
the long-run, rising interest rates, applied successfully in order to stop accelerating 
inflation in the short-run, will feed conflicting-claims inflation again, because price 
setting of surviving firms will have to cover higher interest costs.  
Therefore, central banks, and hence the ECB, should focus on targeting low 
real interest rates in credit and financial markets, as it is included in the mandate for 
the US Federal Reserve, in order to avoid unfavourable cost and distribution effects 
on firms and workers. A slightly positive long-term real rate of interest, below the 
long-run rate of productivity growth, seems to be a reasonable target (see Louis-
Philippe Rochon and Mark Setterfield 2007 for a review of post-Keynesian sugges-
tions regarding the “parking it” approach towards interest rate policies of central 
banks and the rate of interest central banks should target). Rentiers’ real financial 
wealth will be protected against inflation, but redistribution of income in favour of 
the productive sector and at the expense of the rentiers will take place, which should 
be favourable for real investment, employment and growth. Furthermore, central 
banks have to act as a “lender of last resort” in periods of liquidity crisis and should 
be involved in the regulation and the supervision of financial markets. This includes 
the definition of credit standards for refinancing operations with commercial banks, 
the implementation of compulsory reserve requirements for different types of assets 
to be held with the central bank, and even credit controls in order to channel credit 
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into desirable areas and to avoid credit-financed bubbles in certain markets (Thomas 
I. Palley 2010; de Grauwe 2011b; Detzer 2012). 
Most importantly, in the present situation, the ECB should not only act as a 
lender of last resort for the banking system, it should also guarantee public debt of 
the Euro area member countries in a convincing and unconditional way, acting as a 
lender of last resort to the governments, too. The ECB, as a lender of last resort for 
member country governments, would allow member countries to issue debt in their 
“own currency”, and it would immediately reduce the pressure imposed by financial 
markets on those countries presently in crisis, allowing them to regain fiscal sove-
reignty. It would thus provide the conditions for a long-run oriented solution to the 
current account imbalances within the Euro area, as we will explain in the following 
sections. 
In July 2012 the ECB took a major step in this direction when the President of 
the ECB, Mario Draghi (2012), announced: “within our mandate, the ECB is ready to 
do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. However, this was later on qualified such 
that the ECB’s willingness to intervene into secondary government bond markets, in 
the context of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), was made conditional on the 
respective country applying EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes 
(ECB 2012). This link is detrimental to recovery in the crisis countries and to reba-
lancing the Euro area at high levels of economic activity, because imposing fiscal 
austerity policies on the countries in question will make the downswing worse (as it 
did in 2012/2013), lead to the (threat of) deflationary stagnation and will not bring 
government debt-GDP ratios down (as has been observed in the course of the euro 
crisis), (de Grauwe 2011a; Hein 2013b). 
Therefore, Hein (2013b) has argued that the ECB could simply announce that 
it will intervene unconditionally into secondary government bond markets as soon as 
the nominal rate of interest on government bonds (i) exceeds the long-run nominal 
rate of growth of the respective country j, i.e. the sum of real GDP growth ( ) plus 
the rate of inflation ( ): 
 
. (5)
 
This would imply country-specific caps on nominal interest rates on govern-
ment bonds (and to the extent that government bond yields are a benchmark also for 
long-term interest rates in the respective countries in general), making sure that long-
term real interest rates do not exceed real GDP growth trends (see de Grauwe 2011b 
for a similar rule, arguing that the ECB should commit itself to providing unlimited 
liquidity as soon as the government bond rate of a specific country exceeds the risk-
free rate - which is considered to be the rate on German government bonds - by 200 
basis points, in order to prevent moral hazard). If government deficits or debt were 
inflationary - which would have to be prevented by fiscal policies, as will be ad-
dressed further below - governments would be automatically punished by the ECB 
tolerating a higher nominal long-term interest rate, according to this rule. However, 
this is not and should not be regarded as an inflation targeting strategy. 
jYˆ
jpˆ
jjj Yˆpˆi 
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3.2 Wage and Incomes Policy 
 
In an alternative macroeconomic policy mix, incomes and wage policies should take 
responsibility for nominal stabilisation in particular, that is, for stable inflation rates. 
If distribution claims of firms, rentiers, government and the external sector are con-
stant, nominal wages should rise according to the sum of long-run average growth of 
labour productivity in the national economy plus the target rate of inflation for the 
Euro area as a whole: 
 
, (6)
 
with  and pT denoting nominal wage growth and labour productivity growth in 
country j and the inflation target for the Euro area as a whole. Following such a wage 
norm would contribute to equal inflation rates across the Euro area, assuming mark-
ups and unit non-wage costs in pricing to be roughly constant. It would prevent im-
proving the BPCGR of a single country at the expense of the rest of the Euro area 
and it would thus prevent mercantilist strategies based on nominal wage moderation 
in general.  
In order to contribute to the rebalancing of the current accounts within the Eu-
ro area at high levels of economic activity by means of re-adjusting relative price 
competitiveness, wage policies for an intermediate period of time would have to de-
viate from the norm outlined above. Nominal wage growth in current account surplus 
countries would have to exceed the norm, whereas nominal wage growth in the cur-
rent account deficit countries would have to fall short of this norm. Stockhammer and 
Özlem Onaran (2012) have suggested a simple macroeconomic wage rule for the EU, 
which we adapt for the Euro area: 
 
, (7)
 
where ULC denotes nominal unit labour costs in the Euro area (EA) and in country j. 
The inflation target would have to be set such as to avoid deflation in all countries, 
which means it would have to be raised above the current level of “below, but close 
to two per cent”. 
To achieve the nominal wage growth targets, a high degree of wage bargain-
ing co-ordination at the macroeconomic level, and organised labour markets with 
strong labour unions and employer associations seem to be necessary conditions. 
Government involvement in wage bargaining may be required, too. In particular, 
minimum wage legislation, especially in countries with highly deregulated labour 
markets and increasing dispersion of wages, will be helpful for nominal stabilisation 
at the macroeconomic level, apart from its usefulness in terms of containing wage 
inequality. Furthermore, legal extensions of wage bargaining results throughout the 
whole industry or sector and other extension mechanisms, as well as public sector 
bargaining setting the pattern for private sectors, could be helpful. 
For the Euro area and the EU this implies that the prevalent and dominating 
orientation of labour market and social policies towards deregulation and flexibilisa-
tion of labour markets, nominal and real wage restraint and falling wage shares, as 
T
jj pyˆwˆ 
yˆ,wˆ
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previously enshrined in the Employment Guidelines, the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines and now in the Country Specific Recommendations of the European 
Semester and the Memoranda of Understanding with the crisis countries will have to 
be abandoned (see Thorsten Schulten and Thorsten Müller 2013 and European Trade 
Union Institute (ETUI) 2014, Chapters 2-5 for accounts of the most recent develop-
ments of wage bargaining, employment and inequality in the EU). Instead re-
organising labour markets, stabilising labour unions and employer associations, legal 
extensions of collective wage bargaining results, Euro area-wide minimum wage leg-
islation, and so on should be favoured. This could provide the institutional require-
ments for the effective implementation of wage policies stabilising inflation at the 
target rate as well as stabilising functional income shares, ceteris paribus. On the one 
hand, this would imply supporting and encouraging attempts of European trade un-
ions (and employer associations) at cross-border coordination of wage bargaining 
along these lines. On the other hand, this could be supported by coordinated mini-
mum wage policies in the EU and in the Euro area. The European Trade Union Con-
federation (ETUC 2012) had recommended setting the minimum wage at a level of at 
least 50 per cent of the average wage or 60 per cent of the median wage in the re-
spective member countries (on a European minimum wage policy see also Schulten 
2012). Following this idea, OFCE, IMK, and ECLM (2013, Chapter 3) suggest that 
statutory minimum wages should be introduced in those countries where they do not 
exist, unless collective wage-setting institutions are strong and coverage is high (as 
for example in Austria). These minimum wages should then be adjusted by reflecting 
the inflation target, country-wide productivity growth and the current account bal-
ance - assuming that the latter is relevantly affected by price competitiveness. 
Although wage bargaining coordination along the lines outlined above will 
have some merits in terms of reducing inequality within member countries, prevent-
ing further downwards pressures on labour income shares exerted by competitive 
wage policies and beggar-thy-neighbour strategies, and harmonising inflation rates 
across the Euro area, we would not expect too much in terms of rebalancing the cur-
rent accounts within the Euro area. Empirical studies by Michael G. Arghyrou and 
Georgios Chortareas (2008), European Commission (EC 2010) and Carlos Carrasco 
and Patricia Peinado (2014) on Euro area member countries in general, and by Ro-
bert Kollmann et al. (2014) and Servaas Storm and C.W.M. Naastepad (2014) on 
Germany, in particular, have found that current account imbalances are mainly dri-
ven by non-price competitiveness and growth differences, and only to a lesser degree 
by diverging price competitiveness. This implies that the major burden for internally 
rebalancing the Euro area should fall on fiscal policies, adjusting the actual growth 
rate towards the BPCGR in the short-run, and on structural and regional policies, 
raising the BPCGR in the periphery in the medium to long-run. 
 
3.3 Fiscal Policy 
 
In a coordinated policy mix, fiscal policies should take over responsibility for real 
stabilisation, full employment and also a more equal distribution of disposable in-
come. This has several aspects. By definition the excess of private saving (S) over 
private nominal investment (pdI) at a given level of economic activity and employ-
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ment has to be absorbed by the excess of nominal exports (pdX) over nominal im-
ports (pfeM) (including the balance of primary income and the balance of income 
transfers, thus the current account balance) plus the excess of government spending 
(G) over tax revenues (T): 
 
. (8)
 
Therefore, with balanced current accounts ( ), government def-
icits in the long-run perspective (D) have to permanently take up the excess of pri-
vate saving over private investment in order to assure a desired high level of em-
ployment (this is, of course, the “functional finance” view, pioneered by Abba P. 
Lerner 1943; see also Arestis and Sawyer 2004): 
 
. (9)
 
As is well known from Evsey D. Domar (1944), a constant government defi-
cit-GDP ratio (D/Yn) with a constant long-run nominal GDP growth rate ( ) will 
make the government debt-GDP ratio (B/Yn) converge towards a definite value in the 
long-run: 
 
. (10)
 
Furthermore, nominal interest rates falling short of nominal GDP growth and 
hence of tax revenue growth (or low real interest rates falling short of real GDP 
growth) will prevent that government debt services redistribute income in favour of 
rentiers, which would be detrimental to aggregate demand and growth (see Appendix 
C in Hein and Detzer 2014 for a derivation). That is why targeting low interest rates 
on government bonds by the central bank is so important for our policy package.  
Permanent government deficits should be directed towards public investment 
in a wider sense (including increasing public employment), providing the economy 
with public infrastructure, and public education at all levels (Kindergartens, schools, 
high schools, universities) in order to promote structural change towards an environ-
mentally sustainable long-run growth path. Apart from this permanent role of gov-
ernment debt, which also supplies a safe haven for private saving and thus stabilises 
financial markets, counter-cyclical fiscal policies - together with automatic stabilisers 
- should stabilise the economy in the face of aggregate demand shocks. From these 
considerations we get the following requirements for fiscal policies: 
 
D = DL + DS (YT – Y),      DS > 0, (11)
 
with DL as permanent government deficit (or surplus), which is required to keep out-
put at non-inflationary full employment target (YT) in the long-run, the government 
deficit (surplus) balancing the private sector surplus (deficit) with a roughly balanced 
current account, and DS as the reaction in the case of short-run deviations of output 
from target. It has to be added that the non-inflationary full employment level of out-
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put itself is not independent of government expenditures, and of government invest-
ment in a broader sense in particular, because of labour market persistent/hysteresis 
mechanisms and because of the effects of government investment on productivity 
growth (Hein and Stockhammer 2010). 
Furthermore, governments should apply progressive income taxes, relevant 
wealth, property and inheritance taxes, as well as social transfers, which aim at redi-
stribution of income and wealth in favour of low income and low wealth households. 
On the one hand, this will reduce excess saving at non-inflationary full employment 
and thus stabilise aggregate demand - without generating problems of unsustainable 
indebtedness for private households or the foreign sector. Progressive income taxa-
tion and relevant taxes on wealth, property and inheritance thus also reduce the re-
quirements for government deficits. On the other hand, redistributive taxes and social 
policies will improve automatic stabilisers and thus reduce fluctuations in economic 
activity and the required size of short-run discretionary stabilising fiscal policies. 
Applying this approach to the Euro area would require the SGP and its further 
“developments” in the course of the crisis to be abandoned: the “Six-Pack”, the Euro-
Plus Pact, the Fiscal Compact, and the austerity policies imposed on the crisis coun-
tries. Instead, Hein and Truger (2007), Hein (2012, Chapter 8, 2013b), and Hein, 
Truger, and van Treeck (2012) have suggested replacing these means of coordinating 
national fiscal policies by a different method, which focusses on variables govern-
ments can control and which allows coordinated fiscal policiesto be implemented 
along the requirements for short- and long-run real stabilisation at non-inflationary 
full employment and roughly balanced current accounts outlined above. They have 
suggested the coordination of long-run expenditure paths for non-cyclical govern-
ment spending, i.e. those components of spending, which are under control of the 
government. The sum of these expenditure paths should be geared towards stabilising 
aggregate demand in the Euro area at non-inflationary full employment levels, and 
automatic stabilisers plus discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policies could be ap-
plied to fight demand shocks. For each member country this would mean that, on 
average over the cycle and the average net tax rate in each member country given, as 
a first approximation, the path for non-cyclical government expenditure should gen-
erate a “structural” government deficit/surplus, balancing the “structural” private 
sector surplus/deficit at high levels of non-inflationary employment and a roughly 
balanced current account. This would make sure that, on average over the cycle, 
GDP growth is close to the BPCGR of each individual country. Cyclical deviations 
would be dampened by automatic stabilisers and, if required, by discretionary fiscal 
expansion/contraction. As shown above, the government debt-GDP ratios associated 
with such a strategy will not explode, and the ECB keeping nominal interest rates in 
each country below trend nominal GDP growth of the respective country, will make 
sure that debt services will not have restrictive distributional effects. The expenditure 
paths for non-cyclical public sector spending of each member country should be 
coordinated and monitored by the EC and the unwillingness to correct deviations 
should ultimately be sanctioned. 
Following these recommendations would mean a significant contribution to-
wards internally rebalancing the Euro area and prevention of increasing current ac-
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count imbalances for the future. The current account surplus countries would have to 
apply more expansionary fiscal policies than they have, both before the crisis and 
since, in order to increase domestic demand growth. Together with the temporary 
acceptance of higher than Euro area average inflation rates, this would adjust their 
actual growth to their BPCGRs. This would also lift foreign growth for all the current 
account deficit countries, as well as foreign inflation, and therefore raise their 
BPCGR towards their actual rate of growth, and would thus contribute to allowing 
the current account deficit countries to reduce their deficits. Current account deficit 
countries have two options. They can make use of highly restrictive fiscal policies in 
order to adjust their actual rate of growth towards their BPCGR - in fact, the austerity 
policies, which the crisis countries were particularly forced to implement as a pre-
condition for the financial rescue measures, can be considered a version of this. Al-
ternatively, and more favourably, current account deficit countries should aim atac-
tively improving their BPCGR. This means, on the one hand, contributing to a reduc-
tion of the inflation differentials with respect to the surplus countries, by means of 
unit labour cost growth below the sum of national trend productivity growth plus the 
inflation target, as we have argued above, avoiding deflation and redistribution at the 
expense of the wage share and of low income households. On the other hand, current 
account deficit countries would have to increase the income elasticity of demand for 
their exports and to reduce the income elasticity of demand for imports by means of 
industrial, structural and regional policies; this means they have to improve their 
non-price competitiveness. We will address the related issues of this strategy, which 
should be the most promising in the long-run, in the next section. 
As already mentioned in Section 2, we would not expect perfectly balanced 
current accounts of Euro area member countries in the medium to long-run, because 
of necessary catching-up processes in a still quite heterogeneous currency area with 
respect to per capita income, in particular. This means that the catching-up countries 
will have a persistent tendency to grow above their BPCGRs, whereas the mature 
countries will tend to grow below their respective BPCGRs. Coordinating fiscal poli-
cies by means of expenditure paths for non-cyclical government spending and target 
“structural” public sector deficits should therefore take tolerable current account def-
icits associated with catching-up processes into account. On the one hand, this means 
to allow for more expansionary/less restrictive fiscal policies than described in Equa-
tion (9) for high growth catching-up countries, taking into account acceptable current 
account deficits. On the other hand, this implies that fiscal policies in the slow 
growth mature economies could be less expansionary/more restrictive than described 
by Equation (9).  
Coordination of fiscal policies in the Euro area would thus not have to require 
or target perfectly balanced current accounts and would not have to strictly follow 
Equation (9). Sustainably higher growth in the respective current account deficit 
country than in the surplus countries on Euro area average should therefore be the 
ultimate criterion for tolerable current account deficits in the coordination process of 
fiscal policies. The direction and use of the related net capital imports should be part 
of an industrial and regional development strategy aiming at facilitating catching-up, 
as will be discussed in the next section. 
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4. Industrial Restructuring and Sustainable Catching-Up of the 
Periphery 
 
As we have argued above, it is likely that the catching-up countries, due to their 
higher growth potential, will be exceeding their BPCGRs as determined in Equations 
(1) and (2) and will run into current account deficits, which then need to be financed 
by capital imports - thus lifting the BPCGR in line with Equations (3) and (4). In or-
der to finance a smooth catching-up process by capital inflows, several prerequisites 
will have to be met. On the one hand, the capital inflows should be long-term and 
stable in order to contribute to financing a catching-up process, which will not be 
disrupted or undermined by the instabilities of financial markets and financial flows. 
However, the stabilisation of capital inflows as such may not be sufficient. As be-
came clear during the recent crisis, the sustainability of a growth process financed by 
capital inflows hinges largely on the type of domestic expenditure that is financed. 
For the future, bubble growth financed by capital imports should be prevented, capi-
tal inflows should be focused on productivity enhancing investment and the devel-
opment of export capacities, and they should be integrated into a European regional 
and industrial development strategy. We will briefly touch on each of these issues in 
what follows. 
 
Efficient Regulation of and Selective Interventions into Capital Flows 
 
First, there is a case for strict financial regulation in order to avoid unsustainable 
housing, constructions and consumption booms, which have caused the recent crisis. 
Measures should address demand and supply side factors of unsustainable booms. 
Access to credit for consumptive purposes should be restricted so that only sustaina-
ble debt relations are incurred. Micro-prudential measures need to be complemented 
by appropriate macro-prudential tools. With the recent EU capital requirements regu-
lations, new instruments in form of the flexibility package have been introduced 
(Detzer and Herr 2014, Chapter 6.4). A systemic risk board at the EU level has been 
established, which monitors and analyses the build-up of systemic risk, however, it 
has no capacities to intervene. Furthermore, national measures are mostly based on 
capital requirements. However, the effectiveness of these in containing bubbles is not 
well known and may vary over time (Detzer 2012). Alternative or further instruments 
to be applied areas set-based reserve requirements. Their effect is relatively easy to 
determine and they can drive up credit interest rates in specific markets without 
changing the rest of the interest rate structure (Palley 2010; Detzer 2012). In addition 
to this, direct credit controls could be applied to keep a credit driven bubble in check, 
when price based measures are not sufficiently effective.  
 
Industrial and Regional Policy Strategy 
 
Second, in order to achieve a sustainable catching-up process lifting the respective 
BPCGRs the crisis countries need to develop their productive capacities, increase 
productivity and improve export capacities. This does not imply to turn to an “ex-
port-led mercantilist” strategy. On the contrary, increasing the BPCGR through im-
proving export capacities aims at a higher rate of growth associated with a balanced 
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current account at which exports and imports then grow in step, as John McCombie 
(2011) has explained. An “export-led mercantilist strategy”, however, aims at export 
and current account surpluses and hence at stimulating exports and constraining im-
ports. 
Following Alberto Botta (2014), an industrial policy strategy should have a 
strong regional character, because the conditions in the catching-up countries widely 
differ (for reviews of the state of development of industry structures, productivity 
and trade relationships within the EU and the Euro area, as well as the implications 
for industrial policies see the different perspectives in Karl Aiginger (2013, 2014), 
Annamaria Simonazzi, Andrea Ginzburg, and Gianluigi Nocella (2013), Botta (2014) 
and Mario Pianta (2014) for example). Generally, EU industrial and regional policies 
should promote “high road competitiveness” based on high-quality manufacturing 
production as the driver of growth, instead of relying on a low wage, labour intensive 
development strategy (Simonazzi, Ginzburg, and Nocella 2013; Aiginger 2014). A 
“high road” industrial policy strategy requires private and public investment in infra-
structure, education, basic and applied research and development, etc. aiming at 
“new environmentally sustainable, knowledge intensive, high skill and high wage 
economic activities”. Several proposals to revive investment in the Euro area suggest 
improving energy efficiency and the role of renewable energies, in particular (Confe-
deration of German Trade Unions (DGB) 2012; OFCE, IMK, and ECLM 2013).  
According to Thirlwall and Penélope Pacheco-López (2008, Chapter 5), for 
manufacturing sectors to develop, certain forms of protection, such as selective cre-
dits, subsidies to output, as well as selective taxes on imports, may be necessary. 
Several of these instruments of trade protection are not available to EU and Euro area 
member countries. However, Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik (2002) argue that 
trade protection or export subsidies are both just second-best solutions, since they 
cannot discriminate between successful innovators and unproductive imitators. 
Therefore, as a first-best policy, they argue for public sector credit and guarantees. 
Here government development banks, such as the KFW in Germany, which closely 
cooperates with the commercial banking system, could be a good example, and is in 
line with the rules of the single market. Additionally, the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) could be used and support this process in the periphery countries. Likewise, 
the EU Structural Funds could be redesigned to support infant industries in catching-
up countries (Pianta 2014). 
 
Stable Long-Term Financing of Current Account Deficits Related to Successful Catching-Up 
 
Third, successful catching-up will most likely be associated with current account 
deficits in the catching-up countries. This is not a principal problem, as long as 
growth is sustainably higher in the catching-up countries than in the mature current 
account surplus countries, and as long as the deficits are financed in ways that do not 
expose the respective countries to sudden stops or reversal of capital flows. There-
fore, FDI or long-term loans should be preferred over short-term financial invest-
ments. Banking regulation should incentivise banks to use more stable sources of 
finance. The first step in this direction has already been taken in the EU, with the 
new liquidity regulation (Detzer and Herr 2014, Chapter 15.6). A financial transac-
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tion tax may also be helpful to discourage short-term financial investments and make 
long-term real investments more attractive, while also generating financial resources 
for public investment (Stephan Schulmeister 2010). Increasing and pooling a large 
part of public investment spending at the EU level with a focus on the catching-up 
countries would also decrease the need for potentially volatile private capital flows. 
Putting some investment responsibilities at the EU level is sensible, since many of 
the major future challenges can be more easily tackled if the solutions are jointly 
crafted at the EU level (e.g. climate change, development of EU-wide transport net-
work, etc.). Here, an EU institution would raise its own funds raising contributions 
from member countries and/or issuing debt and then provide the necessary capital 
flows to the countries in question by either directly investing in the relevant projects 
or by providing long-term loans to the investors. Several proposals rely on such a 
mechanism (DGB 2012; Jörg Bibow 2013; Yanis Varoufakis, Stuart Holland, and 
James K. Galbraith 2013). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have provided alternative post-Keynesian policy recommendations 
addressing the problems of differential inflation, divergence in competitiveness and 
associated current account imbalances within the Euro area. We have argued that the 
major purpose of these alternative policy proposals should be to generate sustainably 
high demand and output growth in the Euro area as a whole, providing high levels of 
non-inflationary employment, as well as preventing “export-led mercantilist” and 
“debt-led consumption boom” types of development, both within the Euro area and 
with respect to the role of the Euro area in the world economy. We have provided a 
basic framework in order to systematically address the related issues, making use of 
Thirlwall’s (1979, 2002) model of a BPCGR. Based on this framework, we have out-
lined the required stance for alternative economic policies and have discussed the 
implications for monetary, wage/incomes and fiscal policies in the Euro area as a 
whole, as well as the consequences for structural and regional policies, particularly in 
the Euro area periphery.  
We have argued that monetary policies of the ECB should refrain from fine-
tuning output and inflation but should target low real interest rates, focus on financial 
stability and should convincingly act as lender of last resort, both for the banking 
system and for the Euro area member country governments. For the latter, we have 
suggested that the ECB should target country specific caps on government bond 
yields given by the long-run nominal GDP growth rate of the respective country. 
Wage policies should aim at stabilising income shares and contribute to stable infla-
tion rates at the target rate for the Euro area as a whole. Wage policies should also 
contribute to rebalancing price competitiveness within the Euro area, but we would 
not expect large effects on the prevailing current account imbalances. Therefore, the 
major burden for internally rebalancing the Euro area, as well as for stabilising ag-
gregate demand at non-inflationary full employment levels, falls on fiscal policies. 
We have suggested that functional finance fiscal policies should be applied and to 
make use of long-run government deficits/surpluses in order to take up the excess of 
private saving over private investment at non-inflationary full employment output 
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levels in each country, thus also preventing current account surpluses and deficits. In 
order to implement such a policy, we have proposed the coordination of expenditure 
paths for non-cyclical government spending of member countries as a strategy, ac-
cepting the present political preferences, which seem to exclude a United States of 
Europe with a federal government budget for the near future.  
Finally, we have argued that perfectly balanced current accounts within the 
Euro area should not be expected as long as the periphery is catching-up with respect 
to the centre. Successful catching-up will be associated with current account deficits 
in the periphery and current account surpluses in the centre. These should be ac-
cepted and taken into account when coordinating fiscal policies, provided that the 
periphery grows at a sustainably higher rate than the centre. For this purpose, indus-
trial restructuring and catching-up should prevent unsustainable credit-driven bubbles 
and consumption booms, improve existing industries and develop new export indus-
tries in order to lift the BPCGR of the periphery countries. Furthermore, the prevail-
ing and remaining current account deficits require stable capital inflows and we have 
sketched a few variants for this, too. 
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